

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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TAB

TAB D

Recommendation D

1. We do not concur in this recommendation.
2. No action to close the Saigon Bureau should be taken on such scanty evidence. It might be pointed out that at the specific request of the DD/I, the operations of this bureau were expanded in March of 1955. It would seem that a service of common concern should solicit the views of its customers before closing a facility. Furthermore, some financial advantage should accrue from closing one bureau and transferring its activities to a second bureau.
3. Closure of the Saigon Bureau would be entirely acceptable to FBID provided the services to Washington intelligence offices and to the US Government agencies in Saigon are found to be of little value. (FBID has no proprietary interest in any of its services except cruising monitoring or broadcast information. Cruising monitoring is not discussed in any detail in the survey but is essentially a service to FBID itself and is required in order to conduct an intelligent integrated world-wide monitoring service.) The transferral of Saigon Bureau functions to Okinawa would effect no economy; in fact the salary scale at Okinawa is nearly double that of Saigon for monitor personnel and the maintenance of non-indigenous personnel at Okinawa where housing must be provided costs more than at any other FBID bureau. Since the survey recommendation is based on transferring radio monitoring coverage and translation services from Saigon to Okinawa, and since this transferral would involve additional expense, closing of the Saigon Bureau should be decided only on the basis of the value of its contribution to the intelligence community in Washington and to its local Saigon customers.
4. Recent conversations with representatives of the PP/FE Staff indicate that while they are conducting no direct psychological warfare effort in Vietnam they are very active, dealing through the Vietnamese government. They regard the service provided by the analyst assigned to the FBID Saigon Bureau as indispensable in formulating the thematic content of propaganda. This will be confirmed formally.
5. On page 26 of the survey report is a statement that, "The US Ambassador on 22 November 1955 stated to the Inspector General's representative that the Embassy would need the material and that he would urge through his channels in the Department of State that FBIS continue this service." This interest by the State Department and its Embassy has been evident to FBID in the number of State Department cables to and from Saigon referring specifically to FBID messages transmitting the text of Viet Minh and Vietnam propaganda.
6. If the Saigon Bureau were closed and coverage transferred to Okinawa, the reception of some transmitters such as Hanoi would be sporadic to say the least.

TAB D (Cont'd.)

7. In addition to awaiting the US Embassy Saigon expression of need and seeking formal evaluation of the service performed by the analyst from PP/FE, FBID will survey the balance of the intelligence community in Washington and will direct the Saigon Bureau to make a similar investigation locally. Based on the findings a recommendation on the future of the Saigon Bureau will be made through the DD/I.